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Abstract
In this essay, we aim to delineate elements of the Habermas and Hannah Arendt theories 
about the division between public, private and social spheres, as well as about communicative 
action in Habermas, in an attempt to convey transpositions of these concepts into the field of 
organizations. The analysis of the basics of Habermasian construction allows us to take a direct look 
at the delimitation of the field of interactions and the adoption of linguistic categories of analysis 
directed to the individual in the environment. Our argument is that the analysis of language in 
the world of life, for Habermas, means questioning what has not been receiving attention and 
“discovering” what is hidden in the linguistic universe of human interaction and intention.
Keywords: Public sphere. Private sphere. Social sphere. Communicative sction. Jürgen Habermas.
Resumo
Objetivamos, neste ensaio, delinear didaticamente elementos das teorias de Habermas e 
Hannah Arendt sobre a divisão entre as esferas pública, privada e social, bem como sobre o agir 
comunicativo em Habermas, em uma tentativa de aduzir transposições desses conceitos para o 
campo das organizações. A análise das noções básicas da construção habermasiana permite dar 
um olhar direcionado à delimitação do campo de interações e à adoção de categorias linguísticas 
de análise voltadas para o indivíduo no meio. Nosso argumento é que a análise da linguagem 
no mundo da vida, para Habermas, significa questionar o que não vem recebendo atenção e 
“descobrir” o que está oculto no universo linguístico da interação e da intenção humana.
Palavras-chave: Esfera pública. Esfera privada. Esfera social. Ação comunicativa. Jürgen Habermas.
1 INTRODUCING HABERMAS IDEAS
Knowing and analyzing facts of life from the perspective of Habermas’s 
(1989) communicative action theory is one of the most complex missions for critical 
researchers in the social sciences. Complex because these are arid readings, but whose 
ideas have great transformative potential of human action, especially with regard to 
communication and consensus. Habermas, born in 1929, was a pupil of Horkheimer 
and Adorno at the Frankfurt school, and grew up under the Nazi regime, living the 
economic turmoil of the interwar period. His books, articles, and other productions 
are strongly marked by his attachment to the writings of Kant, Hegel, and Marx – 
which made his production esoteric and loaded with an unnecessarily heavy style 
(BRONNER, 1997). Indeed, reading the Habermasian work requires concentration, 
dedication, and remarkable sensitivity and taste for the subjective theoretical cons-
tructs that mark his writing.
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Despite the difficulties we have just described, we assume that what causes 
attraction to Habermas’s work, rather than the eloquence or complexity of reading 
his texts, is the potential of his ideas as means of emancipating man. Habermas is an 
author who remains attached to the critique of reification, reflexivity and, above all, 
the emancipation of individuals from all forms of domination (BRONNER, 1997). 
Throughout his career, he has elaborated one of the most profound studies on the 
subject of rationality in society and has influenced dozens of authors around the world 
interested in the emancipation of man from the constraints imposed by modern indus-
trial society (SERVA, 1997).
The essence of Habermasian ideas is actually relatively simple. In a context 
of conflictual modernity, he was concerned with the public and non-violent force of 
the best argument for the conduct of human relations, rather than any militarized 
action or non-rational domination of society (HUXLEY, 2000). What many would 
consider a utopia, Habermas took to the extreme from his theory of human rational 
action and communication as central elements of democracy (HUXLEY, 2000).
What Habermas has envisioned is a scenario in which humans could base 
their relations through consensus and agreements, from conversations provided with 
understanding facility, integrity, legitimacy and truth. A critical realist epistemologi-
cal posture based on American pragmatism and linguistic philosophy – a combination 
whose purpose was to give a new democratic impulse to critical theory – is assumed 
(BRONNER, 1997).
Transposing this philosophical construction to the theory of organizations 
means, more than dedicating hours to the understanding of texts, to open the possibi-
lity of a profound treatment of the complexity of social phenomena in organizations, 
precisely because it provides an alternative logic to traditional sociological analysis, 
since the focus on the intersubjective relationship between the subject and the other 
through language can provide a theoretical basis capable of leading to emancipation 
in organizations (STEFFY, GRIMES, 1986; VIZEU, 2005).
Without the pretension of exhausting the subject, the proposal of this essay is 
to delineate elements of these theories and to adduce some transpositions for the orga-
nizational theory. For this, this paper is subdivided into three sessions. In the first ses-
sion, this brief introduction. In the second session, the discussion on the subdivision of 
the public, private and social spheres from a parallel between Habermas and Hannah 
Arendt. Finally, in the third session will be presented designs on the communicative 
action of Habermas together with the reflections of the reflective exercise carried out.
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2 THE CONCEPTUAL SEPARATION OF THE PUBLIC, PRIVATE 
AND SOCIAL SPHERES
A series of philosophical dilemmas arises at every attempt to conceptually 
delimit the public, private, and social spheres. To discuss the issue forces the resear-
cher and the theorist to run the risks of reflective reductionism or analytical incomple-
teness given the unimaginable range of issues that may arise from the simple question 
“What is the public sphere?”
Sketching these boundaries can be an endless rhetorical exercise once the 
difficulty of understanding the boundaries between spheres is revealed. We propose 
that the analysis of this merit can be made from Habermas (1984) in parallel with the 
vision proposed by Arendt (1997), since the two authors indirectly establish points of 
convergence in relation to the subject, even though they have not discussed directly 
on this theme.
The distinction between the public and private spheres in Arendt’s (1997) 
thought starts from the view on life and the social environment; after all, the environ-
ment is constituted of human activities, and human activities would have no meaning 
without existence within an environment. Thus, if all human activities are conditioned 
by the fact that the human being lives with other human beings, it is not possible to 
imagine human action outside the social context – therefore, action is the exclusive 
attribute of man as a social being (ARENDT, 1997).
If action is conditioned to the social environment, it is not only the satisfac-
tion of individual interests, but political actions that echo in other men. According to 
Arendt (1997), the association of man and the emergence of the city-state means that 
man possesses, in addition to his private life, a kind of second life, or your bios poli-
tikos. Therefore, “every citizen belongs to two orders of existence; and there is a big 
difference in your life between what is his own (idion) and what is common (koinon)” 
(ARENDT, 1997, p. 34).
The bios politikos consists, according to Aristotelian philosophy, of two ac-
tivities: the action (praxis) and discourse (lexis) – which are nonviolent, coeval and 
coequal trading activites – where the use of the word, or the act of looking for the right 
words at the right time, has the fundamental political action status of life in society 
(ARENDT, 1997).
Communication and discourse gradually become the central elements of 
men’s public life (HABERMAS, 1984). According to Arendt (1997), communication 
becomes one of the elements of the arena of interests between men and mediates 
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conflict between them; living in society means producing discourses with a view to 
persuading others by peaceful means without the use of despotic power typical of 
domestic organization:
In the experience of the polis, which for some reason has been 
considered the most loquacious of the political bodies, action 
and discourse have separated and become increasingly inde-
pendent activities. The emphasis has shifted from action to dis-
course, and to discourse as a means of persuasion not as a spe-
cifically human way of responding, replicating, and confronting 
what happens or what is done. The political being, the living in 
a polis, meant that everything was decided by words and per-
suasion, not by force or violence. For the Greeks, to force so-
meone through violence, to command rather than to persuade, 
were pre-political ways of dealing with people, typical of life 
outside the polis, characteristic of the home and of family life, 
in which the head of the house prevailed with uncontested and 
despotic powers. (ARENDT, 1997, p. 35-36).
From this, a distinction emerges between the public and private spheres. Whi-
le in the first one the exercise of power is conditioned by persuasion and discourse, in 
the last one the dynamics of the exercise of power derives from the family arrange-
ment, determined according to the intimate needs of each individual (HABERMAS, 
1984; ARENDT, 1997). Arendt (1997) understands that the primitive family sphere 
is characterized by human need and lack and by the “obvious” division of the task 
of survival by the work of man and the task of the woman to perpetuate the species. 
Therefore, “the natural community of the home arose out of necessity: it was the need 
that prevailed over all activities carried out in the home” (ARENDT, 1997, p. 40).
For Habermas (1984), the private man status combines the householder’s pa-
per with merchant lord’s one – while he is a man, he is also owner of goods. In this 
sense, the origin of human interests that are opposed in the public sphere lies in the 
needs, interests and subjectivities resulting from the private sphere, which, in other 
words, means that the public nature of public power is influenced by the political rea-
soning of private persons. Thus, the private sphere comprises bourgeois civil society 
in the narrow sense, that is, the commodity and labor exchange sector; the family, with 
its inner sphere, is just another dimension of a larger universe (HABERMAS, 1984).
It is observed, therefore, that the private sphere notion is intrinsically linked 
to the intimate interaction based on concepts of human needs, work, property and 
interests. These are to be the presuppositions of the individual, of the private.
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The public sphere, on the other hand, is the sphere of freedom, and its exis-
tence presupposed victory over the needs of family life (ARENDT, 1997). The public 
sphere, according to Bronner (1997) and Habermas (1984), is the space of freedom 
of man, in which he can exercise his full humanity without any kind of violent cons-
traint: the public sphere is seen as mediating the state and Economic and political 
forces. The public sphere
[...] presupposes equality and the ability of the “common man” 
to employ “common sense”. The public sphere is the arena 
where civil liberties are put into practice [...]. Indeed, with its 
emphasis on free speech and universal values, the public sphere 
becomes a sociological starting point for, ultimately, a philoso-
phical concern with the role of discourse in advanced industrial 
society. (BRONNER, 1997, p. 346).
For Habermas (1984), the public sphere appears more intensively in the bour-
geois layers, by means of the supplementation of the sphere of familiar intimacy and 
by the direct influence of that in the intimacy of the individuals. For Habermas, this 
supplementation occurs to the extent that “sleeping and living rooms are under one 
roof; and since the privacy of one depends on the public nature of the other, the sub-
jectivity of the private individual is from the beginning linked to publicity” (HABER-
MAS, 1984, p. 67-68). The public in this sense adopts the connotation of arena, or of 
the world in which we live, in the measure that is common to all.
In other words, the private sphere is contained in the public sphere. First, 
needs are overcome in the private sphere, contained in the public sphere; overcoming 
these needs allows access to the public sphere and political debate. For Arendt (1997), 
this relation can be symbolized by means of a metaphor: the discussion table. First, 
each one must get his seat at the table (to overcome his or her intimate needs), and 
then participate in an arena that, at the same time, unites and separates the individuals 
and their respective interests, as each one has a place together to the table - that was 
designed to unite people in the same environment, placing them in their proper places 
(ARENDT, 1997).
What about the social sphere? According to Arendt (1997), the social sphere 
is the elevation of the domestic home or of economic activities to the public level, in-
sofar as the domestic administration and all matters pertaining to the private sphere 
have become collective interest. According to Habermas (1989), the social sphere is 
the result of the bourgeois articulation that takes place in the inner sphere, in the great 
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domestic halls where those who owned goods and rights could talk and create coali-
tions to bring their interests to the public sphere. Those interests which, according to 
the author, arose from the shared feeling of an economic, patrimonial and labor do-
mination exercised by the nobility and the clergy to the detriment of the bourgeoisie:
As the state and society interpenetrate, the institution of the 
stricto sensu family stands out from the processes of social 
reproduction: the inner sphere, once the center of the private 
sphere in general, retreats to its periphery as it becomes depri-
ved. These two spheres, once structured in the same direction, 
now develop in the opposite way: “and one can effectively say 
that the family becomes increasingly private, while the wor-
ld of work and organization becomes more and more public”. 
The term “world of work and organization” already reveals so-
mething of the tendency towards the objectification of a sector 
formerly considered to be subject to private devices, whether it 
was the owner’s own property that he had, whether it was for 
the employee, of a property which he did not enjoy. (HABER-
MAS, 1984, p. 180-181).
Continuing this distinction in which distinct spheres of public-public and pu-
blic-social affairs arise, Habermas (1984) argues that the functioning of the social 
sphere, unlike the public sphere itself, is governed by the conflict between public 
opinion and public power. The scope of the traditional public sphere shifts from tradi-
tionally political tasks (social order, jurisdiction) to the civil tasks of a society that pu-
blicly debates the economy and the exchange of commodities (HABERMAS, 1984). 
The bourgeoisie, in the social sphere, then seeks to stand the interests arising from 
private experience in polemical opposition to the res publica politically established 
by the monarchical state.
It is in the social sphere that the professional enterprise evolves into a quasi-
-public sector in front of a private sphere reduced to the family (HABERMAS, 1984). 
Time not occupied by professional activities delimits exactly what is the inner sphere 
of individuals, or their reserve of the private. With large corporations (or organiza-
tions), dominant types of social work organization arise in the face of the separation 
between the private sphere and the public sphere, which Habermas (1984) typifies as 
a neutral sphere. Organizations, then, become an expression of neutrality in the social 
sphere, which is neither wholly public nor totally private.
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The dissatisfactions with the private sphere, then, not being able to be trans-
mitted to the public sphere, are transmitted to the social sphere. The tensions of the 
public sphere and its incapacities to attend to all the interests of the citizens, in the 
same way, not being able to be transmitted also to the private sphere, are also trans-
mitted to the sphere of the social. Organizations, in this sense, become central actors 
of the social sphere:
The companies build houses or even help the employee to build 
a house, form public parks, build schools, churches and libra-
ries, organize concerts and theater sessions, maintain courses of 
improvement, provide for the elders, widows and orphans. The 
oikos of a large company thus determines the life of a city and 
carries a phenomenon that, properly, is designated as industrial 
feudalism. The same applies mutatis mutandis to the large ad-
ministrative bureaucracies of the metropolis, losing its public 
character (in the sociological sense) to the same extent that turn 
into large companies. (HABERMAS, 1984, p. 183).
More striking than these structural changes are the changes that occur in the 
subjectivity of individuals. Organizations become the intermediary institutions be-
tween people and the public. They become arenas of clashes in which the public and 
private spheres are confused. Where individuals take their needs and seek their ful-
fillment; at the same time that work, the social order, and the normative system are 
discussed and implemented. Each person who previously worked only in his or her 
private sphere now goes on to work publicly and goes off in favor of the labor rela-
tionship which, more than anything else, establishes a greater link between employee-
-organization than with other people (HABERMAS, 1984).
Addressing the social spheres of organizations, therefore, means much more 
than just understanding how the dynamics of negotiation and social control between 
individuals occur. It means working the intimate of the human being, his needs, his 
needs, his economic pretensions, in the same way that it means working the public 
purposes and the goals of action at work. It means understanding the discourses that 
shape the political dynamics that exist in a social sphere that shares an infinity of in-
terests and pretensions through the appearance which constitutes reality (ARENDT, 
1997), in the narration of stories in which people bring themselves in their subjective 
and original constructions.
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3 COMMUNICATIVE ACTION THEORY: OUTLINING A 
THEORETICAL SENSE FOR ADMINISTRATORS
Throughout everyday experiences, we often wonder, in situations of extreme 
difficulty, “why can we not reach agreement on simple solutions? It would be easier 
if we were able just to talk and reach a joint solution.” In simple terms, the solution 
to mankind’s conflicts lies in interaction and consensus. This is the initial premise of 
Habermas in developing his theory of communicative action, which starts from the as-
sumption that consensus is possible from the understanding of actions as interconnected 
between individuals, even though diffuse interests are present (HABERMAS, 2002).
But consensus, like any social process, is complex and intersubjective. The 
theory of communicative action, according to Lima and Rivera (2009), is an interes-
ting way to shift from centralized daily praxis to new, more democratic, integrated 
perspectives, based on solidarity, communication, searching for the best argument and 
consensus. Linguistic interaction, in this view, assumes a central role for the materia-
lization of theoretical models capable of guiding human action for democracy and for 
the collective construction of society.
What differentiates the human being from other animals is the ability to un-
derstand their attitudes, gestures and the environment in which they are. Thus, ac-
cording to Ferreira (2000), while we understand the world of life around us, we also 
understand that our actions are responsible for changes in the conduct of other indi-
viduals. For Ferreira (2000), the social act is characterized by a process of symbolic 
action and adaptation of each individual, through gestures, actions and reactions of 
other individuals. According to the author:
The use of gestures and the reflexive ability to think is what ul-
timately enables the human being to adopt the role of the other 
to regulate his or her own behavior. To the extent that a gesture 
represents the idea behind it and provokes that idea in another 
individual, one has a significant symbol, which represents a 
certain meaning; when the gesture arrives at this situation, one 
has a proper language. At the moment when the reaction of a 
second person is provoked by a first individual, becoming a sti-
mulus to control the action of the first organism, then we have 
the significance of the act in the experience of that first indi-
vidual. This relationship of mutual adaptation makes possible 
the emergence of consciousness [...] (FERREIRA, 2000, p. 37).
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As much as the human being means the action of the other, he also interprets 
the environment around him, or, as used by Habermas, the World of Life. The World 
of Life, a concept originally elaborated by Alfred Schutz (SERVA, 1997), means the 
subjective plane that already existed before our birth, and that was experienced and 
interpreted by all our predecessors as an organized world, and that it is up to us rein-
terpret it. However, for Habermas “the world of life does not fulfill only the function 
of context; It offers a provision of convictions, values, norms, to which participants 
in a communicative process make use of consensus-based interpretations.” (SERVA, 
1997, p. 116). The world of life, theoretically systematized, consists of: culture (such 
as the deposit of knowledge, where the human being draws its interpretations); society 
(legitimate ordinances by which men regulate their groups and properties) and finally; 
personality (the unique characteristics and motivations behind an action of a language 
subject) (FERREIRA, 2000). In this way, it is the cognition about scenery and other 
individuals that constitutes the field in which linguistic dynamics occurs.
The linguistic dynamic exudes from the communicative rationality of indivi-
duals and constitutes the externalization of human intentions. The Habermasian con-
sensus, as understood by authors such as Conti and Pinheiro (2011) and Jerônimo 
(2014), refers to the dynamics in which individuals express their interests in the best 
way to convince others of their points of view, whether in search of consensus, or in 
search of social integration. When the individual seeks the transmission of information 
for an end, it is said that the use of language is a strategic action; When language is 
used for social integration and consensus, we are dealing with Habermas’ communi-
cative action (FERREIRA, 2000).
According to authors like Lima and Rivera (2009), Conti and Pinheiro (2011) 
and Jerônimo (2014), communicative rationality presupposes not only the relation 
between context, reasons, norms and argumentative discourse; but also the existence 
of a basis of mutually recognized claims of validity and the semantic content of the 
linguistic issue. In other words, “the concept of communicative action, elaborated by 
Habermas, refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of language and 
action that initiate an interpersonal relationship in which they seek to understand each 
other so that they can co-ordinate their plans of action.” (CONTI; PINHEIRO, 2011, 
p. 4). That is, communicative rationality refers to the ability to use argumentative dis-
course in favor of consensus without resistances that originate conflicts.
That is to say, in simpler terms, that the communicative action is the argu-
ment that wins by being true and according to the context; by having rational ele-
ments behind the communication that are compatible with the cooperative plan of 
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individuals; which, although it may be contrasted with normative elements common 
to society, is not; And that it is accepted as a valid claim by the other to integrate a 
larger, collective plan that benefits everyone.
Communicative action forces individuals to abandon the ego-
centrism of a calculation that is exclusively oriented toward 
their own success. Under the functional aspect of understan-
ding, communicative action serves the tradition and renewal of 
culture; Under the aspect of socialization, serves the formation 
of individual personalities; And under the aspect of coordina-
tion of action, it serves social integration and the creation of 
solidarity. (LIMA; RIVERA, 2009, p. 334).
In the words of the author himself,
Communicative action can be understood as a circular process 
in which the actor is both at the same time: he is the initia-
tor, who dominates situations through imputable actions; at the 
same time, he is also the product of the traditions in which he 
finds itself, of the solidarity groups to which he belongs and of 
the processes of socialization in which he is created. While the 
situationally relevant segment of the world of life impinges on 
the agent, so to speak, frontally, as a problem that he has to sol-
ve on his own account, he finds himself sustained by a world of 
life, which not only forms the context for mutual understanding 
processes, but also provides the resources for this. The world of 
ordinary life in each case offers a provision of cultural truisms 
where the participants in the communication draw their efforts 
from interpreting the consented models of exegesis. (HABER-
MAS, 1989, p. 166).
Authors such as Ferreira (2000) and Huxley (2000) understand that Haber-
mas rejects the philosophy of the subject and focuses on the problem of mutual un-
derstanding, which analyzes inter-subjectivity not only through the constructions of 
individuals, but of the language that expresses itself, and how it is given for consent. 
In this way, the author proposes to overcome the individuation stemming from the 
monological rationality, centered on the self, by the dialogical rationality, that is, the 
rationality through the discourse (FERREIRA, 2000; HUXLEY, 2000).
The concept of interest in dialogic rationality becomes central to the theory 
of communicative action and a link between the context and the application of know-
ledge (BRONNER, 1997). Language is always used for an end and presupposes the 
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mutual understanding between a speaker and a recipient about something in the world 
(FERREIRA, 2000).
For Ferreira (2000), Habermas’s observation that the intended meaning is 
mediated by linguistic signs indicates that the best form of analysis is the attention to 
language itself, and the triple relationship that it originates from the represented thing, 
the meaning and interpreters. Linguistic actions in this sense can take locutionary 
ways – ways in which the speaker seeks to express the state of things, registering fac-
ts, report events and say something without pretension. The illocutionary act, accor-
ding to Ferreira (2000), is one in which the speaker does not report events, but directs 
his speech for their own actions or, in other words, it’s his own conduct by stating his 
actions; on the other hand the perlocutionary act, “the speaker seeks cause an effect 
on the listener.” (FERREIRA, 2000, p. 73).
Strategic action is intimately related to the perlocutionary act, which aims at 
success through the influence of one individual over the other (be it to annoy, humi-
liate, dominate, etc.). The difference, according to Habermas, from the perlocutionary 
act in relation to the illocutionary one is that the last one is subject to rejection by the 
other and its success lies in the comprehension of language, whereas the first one is 
intimately connected to a desirable influence by the speaker and whose success is only 
effected by goal. Therefore, “the understanding and acceptance of discursive actions 
are indicative of illocutionary successes; the finalities that go beyond these are called 
perlocutionary ends.” (FERREIRA, 2000, p. 74).
The communicative action is closely linked therefore with the existence of illo-
cutionary purposes, which cannot thus be achieved without mutual understanding, spee-
ch validation, cooperation and the free acceptance of the recipient – the consent itself.
Participants in the cooperative communication process 
are at the service of reaching a consensus under which 
they can coordinate action plans and realize their own 
intentions for action. The consensus sought should be 
achieved through a rationally motivated agreement, 
with the communicative action between the expectation 
of consensus and the risk of dissent [...] as the different 
spheres of value translate their own logic into social 
structures of the corresponding differentiated spheres 
of life [...] society can become a tension between 
institutionalized action orientations, that is, conflicts of 
action. (CONTI; PINHEIRO, 2011, p. 5).
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The emancipatory action, for Bronner (1997, p. 373), is affirmed “when one 
defines how individual group interests arise and how they become relevant to the 
exercise of freedom and enjoyment by others.” The decentralized understanding of 
the world, based on the understanding of language, the actors behind its use, and the 
perception of the hidden ends embedded in the best argument constitute the essence 
of the emancipation of apparent problems for the analysis of the world of life and its 
real problems.
For Habermas (1989, p. 169), the more one advances in these differentiations, 
the more clearly two things separate: on the one hand, “a horizon of unquestioned 
truisms, shared intersubjectively and not thematized”; on the other, what lies ahead 
as hidden content constituted by communication, as manipulative objects, mandatory 
norms that violate, or even privileged access experiences hidden in society.
The analysis of language in the world of life means, therefore, to question 
what has not been receiving attention and to “discover” what is hidden in the linguistic 
universe of interaction and human intention. The purpose of this analysis is the search 
for a truly democratic and independent consensus of forms of human domination or 
of individual searches that assume linguistic forms of public interest. Undertake such 
analyzes demand, then, a deep knowledge of the field, the rules and elements that 
make up the world of life and understand the language as the source of questions that 
give rise to all problematizations that before were not made, and give attention to all 
that until then were ignored and can be largely, conflicts between individuals.
4 CONTROVERSIES, APPLICABILITY TO ORGANIZATION 
THEORY AND SOME CONSIDERATIONS
Despite Habermas’ great contribution to Organizational Studies in dealing 
with the matter of language and the dynamics of interaction and consensus among the 
subjects, his work has been criticized in other epistemological or theoretical approa-
ches. In this sense, it is possible to identify at least three major fronts that highlight 
some weaknesses in the theory of communicative action. The first criticism is put 
by poststructuralists, who treat in a more utilitarian way the dynamics between the 
subjects. The second criticism is posited by the post-colonialist authors, who treat 
the question of ontology as a form of discursive domination and submission of entire 
societies. Finally, the third criticism comes from the liberals who have worked on 
the issue of the Bad Civil Society, which deals with the issue of certain social groups 
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that freely and spontaneously adopted conducts considered morally reproachable to 
destruct or corrupt society.
The post-structuralist critique is led by French thinkers such as Foucault 
(2008a, 2008b) and Deleuze (1988, 2014), who deal with the issue of power asymme-
tries and the relations of forces between the subjects. By adopting a thought aligned 
with that of Nietzsche, the authors work power between subjects and forms of subjec-
tivation as discursive practices of power, and understand that consensus will always 
be permeated by asymmetries between the subjects, which produce and are produced 
from intersubjectivity strategically elaborated by agents that aim to attend to their own 
wills. The dynamics of power and resistance in these authors is continuous and gives 
great focus to power disputes.
The post-colonialist critique is based on the theoretical constructions of au-
thors like Escobar (1988), Mignolo (1993) and Dussel (1998). According to these 
authors, Habermas’s discursive reason presents as a pretension of moral validity the 
consensus, that is, the right that every subject possesses to participate in communica-
tive relations. As if the subjects had as premise the freedom, equality and dignity to 
participate, jointly, of a space of dialogue. However, what Dussel observes is that in 
political terms, Habermas’s assumption of validity is not followed, for the colonized 
subjects were not, in no historical moment, allowed free speech. Caselas (2009), in 
this sense, goes further, and understands that in current political practices it is still 
possible to perceive the remnant of colonization in representative democracy, as only 
a few groups are heard by the State, while others are simply silenced or ignored in the 
political process.
Finally, the criticism of the theoretical front that studies the Bad Civil Society 
concerns the assumption that people can come together to form a consensus that not 
necessarily leads to the good and progress of civil society. This argument is posed by 
Chambers and Kopstein (2001), for whom it is possible for groups to come together 
not for construction but for the destruction of society, that is, groups that adopt at 
their own will precepts that go against morality and the socially established rules. In 
the view of these authors, consensus will not always result in something positive for 
maintaining the conditions of life in society.
Despite criticism, Habermas’ work has great applicability to studies dealing 
with the public sphere as a space for deliberation and consensus for the achievement 
of social and political goals in democratic regimes. The work has been directed at the 
issues of the mechanisms or forms by which an adequate political deliberation can 
be taken and will, procedurally, attend to the collective interests (BEVIR; RHODES, 
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2016). In the same way, it has been used as a reference for the development of re-
search that deals with the construction of public policies (BRUGUÉ-TORRUELLA, 
2014). In Brazil, studies on communicative action focus on political objects such as 
social movements (GOHN, 1997, 2001), municipal councils and participation in pu-
blic management (MARTINS, 2015). The contributions have been relevant in order 
to allow a greater understanding of the dynamics between the subjects in such contex-
ts. In the same way, it has been possible to understand how the dynamics of interests 
between agents occur in contexts of political deliberation and what are the possible 
obstacles to the possible consensuses among social groups.
Finally, we consider that the potential of the theory can still be explored more 
deeply in relation to private organizations, given its social nature. It is important to 
recognize that companies are composed of relations of both the public sphere and the 
private sphere. In Brazil, for example, we have the development of theoretical studies 
on the ethics of the subjects, the relations of consensus, of collective construction and 
on the resistance inside the companies (VASCONCELOS; PESQUEUX; CYRINO, 
2014; MATTIA; ZAPPELLINI, 2014). On the other hand, we have studies about the 
relations of companies with the State, with society and with the environment – what 
projects the companies for external political relations that affect the collective in ge-
neral way (PESQUEUX; VASCONCELOS, 2013). The possibilities for the applica-
tion of the theory of communicative action and of the analysis of the subject’s action 
in the public, private and social spheres are extensive and can inspire new visions and 
approaches on contemporary problems that constitute the obstacles of the 21st Cen-
tury, especially with respect to the search for the fullness of democracy.
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